Linked employer-employee data for Brazil over a period of large-scale trade liberalization document two salient workforce changeovers. Within the traded-goods sector, there is a marked occupation downgrading and a simultaneous education upgrading by which employers fill expanding low-skill intensive occupations with increasingly educated jobholders. Between sectors, there is a labor demand shift towards the least and the most skilled, which can be traced back to relatively weaker declines of traded-goods industries that intensely use low-skilled labor and to relatively stronger expansions of nontraded-output industries that intensely use high-skilled labor. Whereas these observations are broadly consistent with predictions of Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory for a low-skill abundant economy, classic trade theory is a less useful guide to the observed reallocation pattern. Establishment-level regressions show that exporters exhibit significant employment downsizing. Workforce changeovers are neither achieved through worker reassignments to new tasks within employers nor are they brought about by reallocations across employers and traded-goods industries. Instead, tradeexposed industries shrink their workforces by dismissing less-schooled workers more frequently than more-schooled workers especially in skill-intensive occupations, while most displaced workers shift to nontraded-output industries or out of recorded employment. It remains an important task for research to analyze the impact of economic reform on worker separations, accessions and spell durations outside employment at the individual worker level.
Introduction
Linked employer-employee data are uniquely suited to document labor-market responses to economic reform. The present paper investigates Brazil's labor demand changes following its large-scale trade liberalization in the early 1990s. Measures of labor-demand change document that the workforce in Brazil's traded-goods sector simultaneously undergoes an occupation downgrading and an education upgrading. This workforce changeover is broadly consistent with Heckscher-Ohlin style trade theory for a low-skill abundant economy, whose low-skill intensive activities are predicted to expand and absorb larger shares of skilled workers to maintain full employment. Tracing workers across their jobs within establishments, across establishments within industries, and across firm types and industries in Brazil's formal sector, documents how employers achieve the observed workforce changeover. The reallocation pattern is not what premises of classic trade theory imply: among the displaced workers with a successful reallocation most shift to nontraded-output industries, but almost as many displaced workers do not find formal reemployment at an annual horizon.
The linked employer-employee data source is RAIS (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais), a comprehensive register of workers formally employed in any sector in Brazil (including the public sector). The data base is used to administer Brazil's federal minimum-wage supplement program and shared across statistical agencies. RAIS offers information on worker characteristics such as age, gender, and education, and job characteristics including the wage, dates of hiring and separation, and a detailed occupational classification that permits inferences about the skill intensity of jobs. In the present paper, I restrict attention to prime-age workers past their first entry into the active labor force and to male workers because male workers are known to exhibit relatively low labor supply elasticities.
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I complement the data with firm-level information on export status and sector-level information on economic reforms.
Much emphasis in the literature on job creation and destruction is placed on churning: gross job creation and destruction at shrinking or expanding employers beyond their observed net employment changes. Churning is a particular aspect of the reallocation process and, from a worker's perspective, mostly associated with the part of job spells that are not necessarily related to ultimate reallocations across activities. By definition, churning is an employer-level phenomenon. The present paper shifts the focus from the employer to the individual worker and documents several workerrelated aspects of the reallocation process. The importance of churning and excess turnover in the reallocation process not withstanding, a paramount efficiency concern for the performance of labor markets is the ultimate reassignment of workers to new activities.
Brazil exhibits a shift towards low-skill intensive economic activities following trade reform. For the least skilled illiterate workers and primary school dropouts, the longterm trend of dropping demand is strongly reversed during the time of trade liberaliza-tion and results in a net labor-demand increase through 2001. For college graduates at the upper end of the skill rank, demand surges before and after liberalization especially in the nontraded sector are so strong that the drop in their demand during trade liberalization weighs little; a net demand increase prevails through 2001. Intermediate education groups suffer a demand decline in the traded-goods industries that more than outweighs their moderate demand increase in the nontraded sector. A Katz and Murphy (1992) decomposition into between-industry and within-industry changes shows that a large part of the overall evolution is predicted by these between-industry changes. But there is also a substantial workforce changeover within industries and across occupations.
Measuring jobholders' years of schooling by occupation, and subtracting the mean years of schooling across all occupations, shows a continuous and steady increase in net schooling-intensity across all occupations in the traded-goods sector between 1990 and 2001. This workforce changeover is associated with employment shifts from highto low-skill intensive occupations, while employers simultaneously fill the low-skill intensive occupations with more and more educated jobholders. Both processes, occupation downgrading and education upgrading, are reminiscent of an interpretation of the Heckscher-Ohlin argument applied to occupational activities (instead of industries). Given Brazil's relatively low-skill abundant labor force, a Heckscher-Ohlin style argument would posit that Brazil increasingly specializes in less schooling-intensive occupations but that the traded-goods sector employs in these expanding low-skill occupations relatively more high-skilled workers while their relative wage declines by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
Among several economic reforms-including macroeconomic stabilization, privatization and some capital-account liberalization-, the trade liberalization programme of 1990 played a dominant role for labor-market outcomes. In multivariate regressions at the establishment level, I control for employer-fixed and year effects as well as various variables related to economic reforms and find that an employer's export status along with sectoral tariff protection levels exhibits most predictive power for employment changes. I therefore emphasize trade-related interpretations of labor-demand changes.
Beyond conventional labor-demand analysis, the comprehensive linked employeremployee data for Brazil's economy as a whole permit the tracking of individual workers across occupations, establishments, firm types and industries in Brazil's formal sector. There is no evidence that employers reallocate workers across tasks in-house in response to trade reform. The share of in-house job transitions is constant over time, and minor. Surprisingly, there is also little evidence that the economy reallocates workers across firms and industries. Trade theory would lead us to expect a shift of displaced workers from nonexporting firms to exporters following trade reform. The dominant share of successful reallocations within traded-goods sector is to nonexporters, however, and this share is dwarfed by reallocations to nontraded-output industries. An equally large share of displaced workers, of around a third, finds no formal-sector reemployment at the annual horizon. Taken together, these findings imply that employers pursue the observed workforce changeover by laying off relatively less skilled workers especially from skill-intensive occupation categories. This form of workforce changeover following trade reform is potentially associated with important adjustment costs to the economy. It remains a task for future research to analyze the impact of economic reform on worker separations, accessions and spell durations outside formal-sector employment.
In line with the descriptive evidence, but in contrast to what general-equilibrium trade models with full employment might lead us to expect, a firm's export status predicts significant job losses. There is no conclusive evidence, however, that exporting status is causally related to employment reductions. When firm-level export status and its interaction with product-market tariffs are instrumented for with sector-year varying foreign components of the real exchange rate, export status loses its statistical significance. This speaks to the possible importance of employer-level workforce heterogeneity and suggests the construction of worker-level hiring and firing samples in future research.
While there are only slight differences between metropolitan areas and the nationwide average regarding employer characteristics and the sectoral composition of the labor market, metropolitan labor markets exhibit a markedly faster reallocation success. During the sample period, almost two in three successfully reallocated workers in metropolitan areas find a new job within the month of their separation. In contrast, only one in seven reallocated workers nationwide is rehired within the same month of displacement. In metropolitan areas, 95 percent of the successfully reallocated workers start their new job within twelve months. But only 77 percent of the successfully reallocated workers nationwide find new employment nationwide within a year. These stark differences in labor-market performance could be partly due to the slightly more diverse size distribution or the more varied workforce composition of employers in metropolitan areas, or to the somewhat larger nontraded-output sector in metropolitan areas. Further investigations are called for to improve our understanding of the labor-market specific differences in the reallocation process.
In related studies to examine the effects of trade liberalization on employment, Revenga (1992 Revenga ( , 1997 finds that import competition reduces net employment at the sector level in the U.S. and Mexico. Meanwhile, a large part of the literature adopts the Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) approach of generating gross job flow statistics by industry and year and regressing those statistics on measures of trade exposure and exchange rates. In that line of research, Roberts (1996) , for instance, does not find a strong effect of trade exposure on gross employment flows in Chile and Colombia, once industry characteristics are taken into account. Neither do Davis et al. (1996) identify a clear effect of trade on factor reallocation using U.S. data. However, studies that consider exchange rate effects beyond trade exposure, such as Gourinchas (1999) or Klein, Schuh and Triest (2003) , do find systematic effects on employment flows. Klein et al. (2003) find for the U.S. that job destruction, churning and net employment growth respond to exchange rate movements, while job creation is unresponsive. In the Brazilian case, Ribeiro, Corseuil, Santos, Furtado, Amorim, Servo and Souza (2004) compute industry-level rates of job creation and destruction to find that greater openness reduces employment through increased job destruction, with no effects on job creation, and that exchange rate depreciation increases job creation with no effect on job destruction. Recently, Haltiwanger, Kugler, Kugler, Micco and Pagés (2004) use a panel of industries in six Latin American countries to find that a reduction in tariffs and exchange rate appreciations increase job reallocation within sectors and that net employment growth tends to decline as trade exposure rises. In contrast to the lacking evidence on an association between trade exposure and labor-market outcomes in much of the earlier literature, a firm-level indicator of exporting status in the employer regressions of this paper shows a highly significant relationship between exporting status and employment reductions during a period of trade reform, and a more pronounced association in less tariff-protected sectors. Beyond the prior literature, the linked employer-employee data of this paper permit the tracking of workers across activities, employers and industries, and document these novel aspects of the labor-market response to trade reform.
The paper is organized in six more sections. Section 2 describes the main linked employer-employee data source as well as complementary firm and sector data, while details are relegated to the Appendix. Section 3 presents labor demand changes over the sample period 1986-2001, discerns between-sector and within-sector changes using a Katz and Murphy (1992) labor demand decomposition, and documents the workforce changeover within sectors along educational and occupational dimensions. Section 4 investigates how much of the documented workforce changeover is brought about by task reassignments within firms, worker reallocations across firms and industries, and by worker separations without formal-sector reallocations. Multivariate regressions in Section 5 document the predictive power of exports and trade related regressors compared to competing employer and sector variables. Section 6 looks into labor-market performance as measured by time to successful reallocation. Section 7 concludes.
Linked Employer-Employee Data
A group of particular concern for the labor-market restructuring process are prime-age male workers. The focus on prime-age male workers is motivated by the intention to select a worker group with little labor supply elasticity. Most evidence of this paper nevertheless carries over to the universe of workers across gender and age groups. My restriction to prime age (of 25 to 64 years) serves to capture workers past their first entry into the active labor force. Beyond a one-percent nationwide random sample of prime-age male workers, I also use a five-percent metropolitan random sample of prime-age male workers to assess regional differences in labor-market outcomes.
The linked employer-employee data derive from Brazil's labor force records RAIS (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais of the Brazilian labor ministry MTE ). RAIS is a nationwide, comprehensive annual record of workers formally employed in any sector (including the public sector). RAIS covers, by law, all formally employed workers, captures formal-sector migrants, 2 and tracks the workers over time. By design, however, workers with no current formal-sector employment are not in RAIS.
RAIS primarily provides information to a federal wage supplement program (Abono Salarial ), by which every worker with formal employment during the calendar year receives the equivalent of a monthly minimum wage. RAIS records are then shared across government agencies and statistical offices. An employer's failure to report complete workforce information can, in principle, result in fines proportional to the workforce size, but fines are rarely issued. In practice, workers and employers have strong incentives to ascertain complete RAIS records because payment of the annual public wage supplement is exclusively based on RAIS. The ministry of labor estimates that well above 90 percent of all formally employed workers in Brazil are covered in RAIS throughout the 1990s.
The full data include 71.1 million workers (with 556.3 million job spells) at 5.52 million establishments in 3.75 million firms over the 16-year period 1986-2001 . Every observation is identified by the worker ID (PIS ), the establishment ID (of which the firm ID is a systematic part), the month of accession, and the month of separation. Relevant worker information includes tenure at the establishment, age, gender, and educational attainment; job information includes occupation and the monthly average wage; establishment information includes sector and municipality classifications. To facilitate tracking, RAIS reports, along with additional information on separations, formal retirements and deaths on the job. RAIS identifies the establishment and its firm, which in turn can be linked to firm information from outside sources such as export data.
The sample of this paper derives from a list of all proper worker IDs (11-digit PIS ) that ever appear in RAIS at the national level, from which I draw a one-percent nationwide random sample of the IDs and a five-percent metropolitan random sample, and then track the selected workers through all their formal jobs. Industry information is based on the subsector IBGE classification (roughly comparable to the NAICS threedigit level), which is available by establishment over the full period (see Table 10 in the Appendix for sector classifications). To mitigate potentially spurious reporting, I remove multiple jobs and retain a worker's highest paying job observation at any given point in time. Table 1 shows the allocation of workers across industries in 1990 and 1997 (a detailed employment share breakdown for the RAIS universe can be found in Table 10 in the Appendix). The nationwide RAIS records represent almost 23 million formally employed workers of any gender and age in 1990, and more than 24 million formal workers by 1997. The bulk of Brazil's formal employment is in manufacturing, services and other industries (which include construction, utilities and the public sector), with roughly similar formal employment shares between a quarter and a third of the overall formal labor force. Commerce (wholesale and retail) employs around one in eight workers, and the primary sector (agriculture and mining) at most one in twenty-five workers. Prime-age male workers nationwide make up slightly less than half of the total workforce in 1990 and 1997. In both years, prime-age male workers are slightly more frequently employed in the primary and manufacturing sector than the average worker of any gender and age but less frequently in commerce, services and other sectors. More than half of the RAIS -reported formal employment of prime-age males occurs in the six metropolitan areas of Brazil: São Paulo city, Rio de Janeiro city, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador, and Recife. Compared to the nationwide average across gender and age, prime-age males in metropolitan areas are slightly less frequently employed in the primary sector, commerce, and other sectors, and somewhat more frequently employed in manufacturing and services. Overall, however, the labor allocation across sector is broadly similar across regions and gender and age groups, whereas changes over time between 1990 and 1997 are more pronounced. Between 1990 and 1997, there is a marked drop in formal manufacturing employment, which is accompanied by an increase of employment in primary sectors, commerce, and especially services. Overall, between roughly a quarter and a third of the nationwide and metropolitan prime-age male workforces are employed in traded-goods sectors, and two thirds to three quarters in nontraded-output sectors.
Complementary firm-level export data. At the firm level, annual customs office records from SECEX (Secretaria de Comércio Exterior ) for 1990 through 1998 are used to infer an indicator variable for a firm's exporting status, which is set to one when SECEX reports exports of any product from the firm in a given year. I link the export-status indicator to RAIS at the firm level. SECEX includes merchandize exports, but not services exports. National accounting data suggest that, during the 1990s, Brazilian services exports were of minor importance. Table 1 shows the allocation of prime-age male employment by exporting status of the employer, and by sector, for the period from 1990 to 2001. Whereas nationwide only 17 percent of prime-age makes work at exporters, that share is 22 percent in metropolitan areas. Not surprisingly, the largest share of prime-age male employment at exporters occurs in the manufacturing sector with more than fifty percent of the sector's workforce nationwide and over sixty percent in metropolitan areas. Primarygoods producers in agriculture and mining employ only 12 percent (nationwide) and 24 percent (metropolitan) of the sector's workforce-possibly because some of their exports, especially in agriculture, are channelled through commercial intermediaries. My focus will therefore lie on the manufacturing industries in the traded-goods sector. There are merchandize exporters also among the commercial, service and other-sector firms with employment shares in those sectors between 6 percent (nationwide) and 11 percent (metropolitan). These employment shares are small, however, compared to those in the primary and manufacturing sectors, and the SECEX data show that those firms' exporting status mostly reflects occasional merchandize shipments.
Complementary sector data. Data on ad valorem tariffs by sector and year from Kume, Piani and Souza (2000) serve as measures of output-market tariffs and, after combining them with economy-wide input-output matrices (from IBGE ), provide intermediate-input tariff measures by sector and year. I transform those tariff series from the Nível 80 level to the subsector IBGE classification available in RAIS by taking unweighted subsector means over the original Nível 80 data. Ramos and Zonenschain (2000) report national accounting data to calculate the effective rate of market penetration with foreign imports. I define the effective rate of market penetration as imports per absorption under the assumption that domestic firms find the absorption market the relevant domestic environment in which they compete. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow data from the Brazilian central bank (Banco Central do Brasil ) are available for 1986 through 1998. I construct sector-specific real exchange rates from the nominal exchange rate to the U.S. dollar E, Brazilian wholesale price indices P j (from FGV Rio de Janeiro), and average foreign price series for groups of Brazil's main trading partners P * j by sector j. I define the real exchange rate as q j ≡ EP * j /P j so that a low value means an appreciated real sector exchange rate. I re-base the underlying price series to a value of 1 in 1995. Brazil's import shares from its major 25 trading partners in 1995 are used as weights for P * j . I obtain sector-specific annual series from producer price indices for the 12 OECD countries among Brazil's main 25 trading partners (sector-specific PPI series from SourceOECD; U.S. PPI series from Bureau of Labor Statistics). I combine these sector-specific price indices with the 13 annual aggregate producer (wholesale if producer unavailable) price index series for Brazil's remaining major trading partners (from Global Financial Data), for whom sector-specific PPI indices are not available in general.
Economic Reform and Employment Changeovers
Since the late 1980s, Brazil's federal government initiated a series of economic reforms that by around 1997 resulted in a considerably more open economy to foreign goods and investments, a stable macroeconomy, and a somewhat smaller role of the state in the economy. In 1988, after decades of import substitution and industry protection, the Brazilian federal government under president Sarney initiated an internal planning process for trade reform and started to reduce ad valorem tariffs but, lacking public support, took little legislative initiative to remove binding non-tariff barriers so that nominal tariff reductions had little effect (Kume et al. 2000) . In 1990, the Collor administration launched a large-scale trade reform that involved both the removal of non-tariff barriers and the adoption of a new tariff structure with lower levels and smaller cross-sectoral dispersion. Implementation of these policies was largely completed by 1993. Figure 1 depicts Brazil's product-market and intermediate-input tariff schedules in 1990 and 1997 for the twelve manufacturing industries at the subsector IBGE level. Intermediate input tariff levels are calculated as re-weighted product tariffs using the economy-wide input-output matrix. Both the level and the dispersion of tariffs drop remarkably between 1990 and 1997. While ad valorem product tariffs range from 21 (metallic products) to 63 percent (apparel and textiles) in 1990, they drop to a range from 9 percent (chemicals) to 34 percent (transport equipment) in 1997. Except for paper and publishing in 1990, sectors at the subsector IBGE level receive effective protection in both years, with mean product tariffs exceeding mean intermediate-input tariffs. By 1997, however, the relatively homogeneous tariff structure results in a small rate of effective protections for most industries-with the notable exception of transport equipment.
Brazil underwent additional reforms over the sample period. In 1994, during the Franco administration and under the watch of then finance minister Cardoso, drastic anti-inflation measures succeeded for the first time in decades. A privatization program for public utilities was started in 1991 and accelerated in the mid 1990s, while Brazil simultaneously liberalized capital-account restrictions. These measures were accompanied by a surge in foreign direct investment inflows in the mid 1990s. The pro-competitive reforms during the 1990s, mostly targeted at product markets, had been preceded by changes to Brazil's labor-market institutions in 1988. Brazil's constitution of 1988 introduced a series of labor-market reforms that aimed to increase workers' benefits and the right to organize, thus raising labor costs.
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Given their constitutional status, these labor-market institutions remained unaltered throughout the sample period.
Among the reforms, trade liberalization played a dominant role for labor-market outcomes. Multivariate regressions in Section 5 will control for sector and year effects as well as variables related to simultaneous reforms and confirm the overwhelming predictive power of trade liberalization and an employer's export status for employment changes. In light of these findings, I emphasize trade-related interpretations of the labor-demand changes in this and subsequent sections.
Between and within industry demand shifts. Katz and Murphy (1992) derive a framework to decompose labor demand changes into shifts between industries, associated with variations in sector sizes given sectoral occupation profiles, and within industries through changing occupation intensities. The former shifts between industries relate to the changing allocation of employment across sectors, whereas the latter shifts within industries reflect the change in relative skill intensities of occupations or alterations to the sectoral production process. Applying the Katz and Murphy (1992) framework to employment in the Brazilian formal sector over the years 1986-2001 reveals main patterns of labor-market adjustment. The decomposition into between and within sector variation indicates how two important sources of change contribute to workforce changeover. Between-industry shifts can be though of as driven by changes in final-goods demands, sectoral differences in factor-nonneutral technical change, and changes in the sector-level penetration with foreign imports. Within-industry shifts can be related to factor-nonneutral technical change, factor-price changes for substitutes or complements to labor, and international trade in tasks which allocates activities along the value chain across countries.
The Katz and Murphy (1992) decomposition is designed to measure the degree of between-industry labor demand change under fixed relative wages, and tends to understate the true between-industry demand shift in absolute terms when relative wages change. Though possibly overstating the within-industry effects, the Brazilian evidence suggests that within-industry demand changes are an important source of employment changeover in Brazil especially since 1990. Beyond the Katz and Murphy (1992) framework, I therefore offer statistics that document time variation in the occupation profile within industries, and the skill changeover within occupations.
Under the assumption that the aggregate production function is concave (so that the matrix of cross-wage elasticities of factor demands is negative semi-definite), Katz and Murphy (1992) show that an appropriate between-industry demand shift measure ∆D k for skill group k is
where X jk is the employment of skill group k in industry j, w is the k × 1 vector of wages, and dX j and X j are the k × 1 vectors of employment changes and levels in industry j, respectively. So, this measure is the vector of weighted sums of sector employments for each skill group, with the weights given by the percentage changes in the wage bill in each sector at constant wages. Under the assumption of constant wages, the measure reflects whether the employment data are consistent with stable labor demands within sectors. To implement the measure empirically, I divide the formal-sector economy into 26 two-digits industries (using the subsector IBGE classification) and five occupations (professional & managerial occupations, technical & supervisory occupations, other white-collar occupations, skill-intensive blue-collar occupations, and other blue-collar occupations). The classification of activities into both sectors and occupations is motivated by the idea that international trade of intermediate and final goods can be understood as trade in tasks along the steps of the production chain. Using the resulting 130 industry-occupation cells, an empirically attractive version of the between-industry demand shift measure (1) is
where E i is total labor input in sector-occupation cell i measured in efficiency units, and α ik ≡ E ik /E i is skill group k's share of total employment in efficiency units in sector i in the base period. Measure (2) expresses the percentage change in demand for each skill group as a weighted average of the percentage changes in sectoral employments measured, the weights being the group-specific efficiency-unit allocations. Following Katz and Murphy (1992) , I turn index (2) into a measure of relative demand changes by normalizing all efficiency-unit employments in each year to sum to unity. The base period is the average of the sample period from 1986 to 2001 so that α ik is the share of total employment of group k in sector i over the 1986-2001 period and E k is the average share of skill group k in total employment between 1986 and 2001. The overall (industry-occupation) measure of demand shifts for skill group k is defined as ∆X di k from equation (2), where i indices the 130 industry-occupation cells. The between-industry component of this demand-shift measure is defined as the group-k index ∆X dj k from equation (2), where i = j now indexes only 26 industries. Accordingly, the within-industry component of demand shifts is ∆X Table 2 presents the nationwide demand decomposition and the overall demand shifts by group of educational attainment for the economy as a whole, and separately for the traded-goods and the nontraded-output sectors. As in Katz and Murphy (1992) , the percentage changes are transformed into log changes with the formulâ ∆X
. By construction, in the (vertical) sectoral dimension the economy-wide demand shift indices for each skill group are a weighted sum of the traded and nontraded sector indices (except for occasional rounding errors because of the log transformation), where the weights are the skill groups' shares in the sectors. In the (horizontal) time dimension, the indices are the sum of the time periods for each skill group.
The entries for overall shifts across all sectors summarize Brazil's labor-demand evolution (five first rows of column 12). Over the full period from 1986 to 2001, the least and the most skilled prime-age male workers experience a positive relative demand shift of 1 and 8 percent, respectively, whereas the three intermediate skill groups suffer a labor demand drop. This overall pattern, with demand surges at the extreme ends of the skill spectrum and drops for the middle groups, can be traced back to two overlaying developments. First, before and after the main economic liberalization episode, that is in the periods 1986-90 and 1997-2001 , demand for college graduates rises by around 5 percent while demand drops for all other skill groups in 1997-2001 and for all other skill groups but high-school graduates in 1986-90. Second, however, during the period of economic liberalization between 1990 and 1997 the reverse labor demand change occurs, with demand for the least-educated males increasing by roughly 5 percent and dropping for college graduates by -2 percent. The demand rise for the least-educated during liberalization more than outweighs the demand drops before and after so that a net demand increase remains by 2001. For college graduates, demand surges before and after liberalization are so strong that the drop during liberalization is of little importance and a strong net demand remains by 2001. This pattern is consistent with a Heckscher-Ohlin interpretation of the specialization pattern following trade liberalization. Brazil, whose labor force is relatively low-skill abundant, experiences a shift towards low-skill intensive economic activities between 1990 and 1997-against the longer-term trend manifested before (1986-90) and after (1997-2001) by which demand 
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Source: RAIS 1986-2001 (1% random sample), male workers, 25 years or older. Overall and between-industry demand shift measures for skill group k are of the form
, where α jk is the average share for group k of employment in cell j over the period 1986-2001, E j is the share of aggregate employment in cell j, and E k is the average share of total employment of group k over the period 1986 -2001 (Katz and Murphy 1992 . Reported numbers are of the form log(1 + ∆D k ).
In the overall measure, j indexes 130 industry-occupation cells; in the between-industry measure, i = j indexes 26 industries (14 traded-goods and 12 nontraded-output sectors). The within-industry index for group k is the difference of the overall and between-industry measures. Employment is measured in efficiency units.
for highly skilled workers increases but drops for lower-skilled workers. Between and within decompositions, as well as a distinction of traded and nontraded sectors, lend additional support to a Heckscher-Ohlin interpretation of labor demand changes. The decomposition for all sectors (five first rows) into between-industry and withinindustry changes indicates that the overall evolution is mostly driven by betweenindustry changes, with demand surges at the extreme ends of the skill spectrum and drops for the middle groups (column 4). In contrast, the within-industry labor demand changes favor the least skilled the least, with a demand drop of -3 percent, and the most skilled the most, with a demand increase of 1 to 2 percent for high-school educated workers and college graduates. The within-industry demand changes are almost monotonically increasing as we move up the educational attainment ranks (column 8) in the 1986-2001 period, and would indeed monotonically increase if it were not for a within-industry drop in demand for college graduates during the liberalization period. I will return to the within-industry demand changes with additional evidence further below. In fact, the within-industry workforce changeover will be found to reinforce a broad Heckscher-Ohlin interpretation of Brazil's experience.
A distinction by sector relates the between-industry demand evolution to differences across traded-goods industries (middle five rows) and nontraded-output industries (last five rows). In the traded-goods sectors, where trade liberalization is expected to exert its impact, Brazil experiences a salient labor demand drop-beyond -10 percent for the three more educated skill groups between 1986 and 2001. Expectedly for a lowskill abundant country, the demand drop is the strongest for the highly skilled and the weakest for the low skilled workers (column 4). Most notably, during the liberalization episode illiterate workers and primary school dropouts experience a rise in demand due to between-industry shifts, whereas more skilled workers experience demand drops of monotonically larger magnitudes as we move up the skill ladder (column 2). The nontraded-output sectors exhibit a relatively homogeneous demand increase between 6 and 8 percent for workers with no college degree and a strong 12-percent increase for college graduates (column 4). The demand increase for the least skilled in nontradedoutput sectors combined with only a slight demand drop for them in the traded-goods sectors results in an overall positive demand for the skill group from the betweenindustry component (column 4). Similarly, the strong demand for college graduates in nontraded-output sectors more than outweighs their demand drop in traded-goods sectors. For intermediate skill groups between these two extremes, the demand drop in the traded-goods sectors outweighs their demand increase in nontraded-output sectors and results in overall negative demand changes.
Within industries there is a clear and pronounced pattern of falling demand for the least skilled, and increasing demand for the more skilled, with monotonically stronger demand changes as we move up the skill ranks, except only for college graduates (column 8) . This pattern is similar across both traded and nontraded sectors and most time periods. The reason for the break in monotonicity at the college-graduate level (column 8) is a demand drop for this skill group during the liberalization period (column 6). A Stolper-Samuelson explanation is consistent with the outlier behavior of Within-industry employment changeovers. The demand decompositions above show a noteworthy within-industry labor demand reduction for low-skilled workers and a demand increase for high-skilled workers both in traded-goods and nontraded-output sectors. The sources of this change deserve more scrutiny. Abandoning the efficiencyunit perspective on employment in favor of counts of workers to keep wage effects separate, I turn to an assessment of labor allocation to activities by period.
4 Figure 2 shows the evolution of the skill assignment by occupation over time. In both traded-goods and nontraded-output sectors, there is a marked increase across all five occupation categories in the educational attainment of the job holders. From 1986 to 2001, the mean number of years of schooling in unskilled blue-collar occupations rises from below four years to more than five years in both traded and nontraded sectors (in traded sectors schooling in unskilled blue-collar occupations even slightly exceeds the schooling in skilled blue-collar jobs by 2001). The average number of school years increases from around four to more than five years for skilled blue-collars jobs in traded sectors and to more than six years in nontraded sectors by 2001. For unskilled white-collar occupations, the average job holder's schooling goes from around six to more than eight years both in traded and nontraded goods sectors. The shift also extends to technical and supervisory positions, where the average job holder's schooling goes from less than ten to more than ten years of schooling both in traded and nontraded sectors, and to managerial positions, where mean schooling rises from eleven to almost twelve years over the period 1986-2001. These largely steady withinindustry changeovers in workers' occupational assignments between 1986-2001 overlay the shorter-lived between-industry changes with much time variation across the three subperiods 1986-90, 1990-97 and 1997-01. One might suspect that the considerable surge in schooling levels is partly due to labor supply changes such as the entry of increasingly educated cohorts of male workers into the labor force, or relatively more frequent shifts of skilled male workers from informal to formal work status over the sample period. In fact, the sector-wide average schooling level rises from less than six to more than six years in the traded-goods sector, and in the nontraded-output sector from more than six to more than eight years (as the respective overall curves in Figure 2 show). To control for overall skill labor supply by sector, I extend the Katz and Murphy (1992) idea to the present context and subtract the mean annual years of schooling in a sector from the occupation-specific means in the sector. For this purpose, I consider all traded-goods industries as one sector, and all nontraded-output industries as another sector. Subtracting the annual mean years of schooling, instead of dividing by the annual total as in Table 2 before, preserves the cardinal skill measure of years of schooling and expresses occupation-specific skill demands as deviations from the sector-wide employment evolution in terms of years of schooling. Figure 3 presents average years of schooling by occupation, less the sector-wide mean schooling across all occupations. By this measure, skill demand within every occupation category increases in the traded-goods sector since 1990: from a difference of -1.6 to -0.9 years in unskilled blue-collar occupations, from -1.2 to -1.1 years in skilled blue-collar occupations, from 0.8 to 1.7 in unskilled white-collar jobs, from 3.9 to 4.4 in technical jobs, and from 4.9 to 5.4 in professional and managerial positions. For all three white-collar occupation categories, the schooling-intensity surge beyond the sector average since 1990 is a reversal of the opposite trend prior to 1990, while schooling-intensity continually increases for blue-collar occupations in the traded sector since 1986. By construction, the persistent occupation-level increases in worker schooling since 1990 go beyond the change in the sector-wide workforce schooling. The puzzling pattern that changes beyond the sector mean are uniformly directed towards higher schooling in every single occupation since 1990 suggests that there must be an employment expansion in less skill-intensive occupations-otherwise it would be impossible for every single occupation category to exhibit a faster skill-intensity increase than the average over all occupations. In contrast to the traded sector, nontraded-output industries do not exhibit the uniform pattern of schooling increases across all occupations but a drop in schooling intensity in the technical and managerial occupations, and a rise in schooling intensity in skilled blue-collar occupations.
The evolution of schooling intensity in Brazil's traded-goods sector is reminiscent of a Heckscher-Ohlin interpretation as well-though not for industries but for tasks. Think of production activities in the Heckscher-Ohlin framework not as sectors but as occupations and suppose that Brazil has a relatively less schooled labor force than its main trading partners. Brazil's top five trading partners in total trade volume during the 1990s are, in descending order, the U.S., Argentina, Germany, Italy and Japan. As Brazil's integration into the world economy advances, thus reinterpreted Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory predicts that Brazil increasingly specializes in less schooling intensive occupations but that Brazil employs in these expanding occupations relatively more high-skilled workers because their relative wage declines. Gonzaga et al. (2006) document that Brazil's skilled earnings differential narrows over the 1990s. Of course, more research is required to discern this reinterpretation of classic trade theory from alternative explanations. The simultaneous schooling-intensity increase in every single occupation, above and beyond the sector mean, could also be related to factor-nonneutral technical change or factor-price changes for substitutes to labor, and not only to international trade in tasks. Yet, the prediction of reinterpreted classic trade theory that foreign trade expands less schooling-intensive occupations in Brazil's traded-goods sector is fully consistent with the data. Figure 2 that the average worker's schooling in both skilled and unskilled blue-collar jobs in the traded-goods sector is roughly the same. The growing importance of skilled blue-collar occupations comes at the expense of all other occupations in the traded-goods industries. At the low-skill intensity end, the share of unskilled blue-collar occupations drops from more than 13 percent in 1990 to 8 percent in 1994 (but recovers slightly to close to 9 percent by 2001). More importantly, the expansion of skilled blue-collar occupations in traded-goods sectors comes at the expense of white-collar occupations, whose total employment share drops from 27 percent in 1990 to 24 percent in 1994 and 20 percent in 2001. In the nontraded-output sectors, in contrast, it is the unskilled blue-collar occupation category that expands the fastest from 13 percent in 1990 to close to 16 percent by 2001, whereas skilled blue-collar jobs are cut back from a share of 34 in 1990 to around 29 percent by 1997. Similarly, within white-collar occupations it is again the less skill-intensive occupations that exhibit a relative gain: the share of unskilled white-collar workers rises from 16 to 18 percent between 1990 and 1995 (with a crawling scale-back to 17 percent until 2001), and the share of technical occupations increases from 20 in 1990 to 21 percent in 1995. But the share of professional and managerial positions remains roughly constant between 16 and 17 percent, thus losing in relative importance to less skill-intensive white-collar occupations.
This shift across the occupation profile towards less skill-intensive occupations permits a skill-upgrading workforce changeover, by which less skill-intensive jobs are being filled with more educated workers especially in the traded-goods sector. In practice, employers can achieve this workforce changeover in many ways. Employers can either reallocate workers across tasks in-house, or the economy can reallocate workers across firms and sectors, or there may be no reallocation for extended periods of time if employers pursue the workforce changeover by laying off less skilled workers from every occupation category in the absence of compensating rehiring within the formalsector. The latter form of workforce changeover would arguable be associated with considerable adjustment costs to the economy.
Worker Reallocations across Activities
Labor-demand decompositions so far have shown that there are two main components to the observed workforce changeover in Brazil over the sample period. First, there is a labor demand shift towards the least and the most skilled male workers, which can be traced back to relatively weaker declines of traded-goods industries that intensely use low-skilled labor and to relatively stronger expansions of nontraded-output industries that intensely use higher-skilled labor. Second, there is a within-industry shift towards longer-schooled workers, associated with a skill-upgrading of all occupations in tradedgoods industries. To track how employers achieve the observed workforce changeover during the sample period, I exploit the comprehensive linked employer-employee data for Brazil's economy to trace individual workers across their jobs within establishments, across establishments within sectors, and across firm types and sectors in Brazil's formal sector.
Reallocations across tasks. Employers may choose to reallocate workers across tasks in-house. For this purpose, I define an in-house job change as a change in employment between an occupation at the CBO base-group level to another base-group occupation. The 354 CBO base groups roughly correspond to the 4-digit ISCO-88 occupations at the unit-group level.
5 Table 3 shows both continuing and displaced workers and tracks the workers through jobs at the annual horizon between 1986 and 1997. The task assignment pattern is remarkably stable both before and after trade liberalization. Between 86 and 87 percent of formal-sector prime-age male workers remain in their job at the same employer. Only between 1 and 2 percent of the workers are assigned to new occupations within the same establishment. Less than one percent of the workers switches establishments within the same firm. Between 7 and 9 percent of the workers change employing firm at the annual horizon. So, the bulk of successful reallocations does not take place on internal labor markets but across firms. I will trace the reallocations between exporters and nonexporters and across sectors shortly. The remaining 3 to 4 percent of workers (not reported in Table 3 ) are unaccounted. I will also turn to those failed reallocations shortly. Overall, the stable and minor percentages of occupation and establishment reassignments within employers suggest that the observed workforce changeovers, documented in the preceding section, are not achieved through job reassignments in internal labor markets.
Reallocations across firms and sectors. Between 1990 and 1998, around 6 percent of the formal-sector workforce nationwide is employed at primary-sector nonexporters, one percent at primary-sector exporters, 11 percent at manufacturing nonexporters, and 12 percent at manufacturing exporters. The remaining seventy percent of the workforce are employed in the nontraded sector. I now look beyond internal labor markets and investigate whether and how the relative expansion of certain traded-goods industries, in the wake of an overall decline of the traded-goods sector, is associated with reallocations of individual workers across firms and sectors. To capture differences in the labor demand responses across subsectors and firms within the traded-goods sector, I track individual workers across exporting and nonexporting employers in the primary and manufacturing industries. Table 4 shows worker transitions between firms and sectors over the first year after trade reform, between their last observed formal-sector employment in 1990 and their last observed formal-sector employment in 1991. Only workers who experience a sep- Source: RAIS 1996-97 (1% random sample), male workers nationwide, 25 to 64 years old. SECEX 1996-97 for exporting status. Frequencies are job accessions in Brazil within one year after separation, based on last employment of year (highest paying job if many). Failed accessions are separations followed by no formal-sector accessions anywhere in Brazil within a year, excluding workers with prior retirement or death, or age 65 or above in earlier job.
aration from their last employment of the year are included in the transition statistics. Trade theory might lead us to expect a shift of displaced workers from nonexporting firms to exporters following trade reform. The dominant share of successful reallocations of former nonexporter workers within the traded-goods industries, however, is to nonexporters again. Among the former nonexporter workers displaced from primarysector employment, close to 11 percent are rehired at primary nonexporters and 10 percent at manufacturing nonexporters, but less than two percent shift to exporters. Among the former nonexporter workers in manufacturing, 19 percent move to manufacturing nonexporters and 7 percent no manufacturing exporters, and a very small share to primary-sector firms. Former exporter workers, in contrast, mostly transition to new formal-sector jobs within the sector of displacement and are roughly equally likely to find reemployment at an exporter or a nonexporter. These patterns suggest that reallocations within the traded goods sectors are mostly intra-sector reallocations from exporter to exporter and from nonexporter to nonexporter-contrary to what classic trade theory with full employment and only traded goods might lead us to expect.
In the initial year after trade reform, between one third and two-fifths of displaced traded-sector workers with a successful reallocation end up in nontraded-sector jobs. An equally large fraction, however, fails to experience a successful reallocation to any formal-sector job within the following calendar year (retirements, deaths, and workers at or past retirement age are excluded from the displaced worker sample).
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Of the workers with a failed reallocation before year-end 1990, by far the largest fraction (of 78 percent) with a successful reallocation by year-end 1991 finds employment in the nontraded-sector. In summary, at the time of the largest impact of trade liberaliza-tion in 1990-91, traded-goods industries exhibit little absorptive capacity for displaced workers compared to nontraded-output industries and compared to the prevalence of failed transitions out of the formal sector. Among those failed reallocations can be transitions to informal work, unemployment, or withdrawals from the active labor force, which are not directly observed in the RAIS records.
In comparison, Table 5 tracks annual transitions six years after the beginning of trade liberalization and three years after its conclusion. By 1996-97, more firm and sector reallocations from the primary sector are directed to jobs within the tradedgoods sector. In the manufacturing sector, however, the dominant destination sector of displaced workers remains the nontraded sector in 1996-97, both for workers from exporters and for workers from nonexporters. As in the initial period 1990-91, in 1996-97 former nonexporter workers most frequently find reemployment at nonexporter firms, and former exporter workers are roughly equally likely to find reemployment at exporter and nonexporter firms in manufacturing but less likely to transition to an exporter in the primary sector. By 1996-97, an even larger fraction of displaced primary-sector workers than in 1990-91 fails to experience a successful formal-sector reallocation and a roughly equally large share of former manufacturing workers as in 1990-91 fails to find a formal-sector job within the following calendar year.
Together with the evidence on infrequent task reassignments in-house, these labormarket transitions suggest that the observed workforce changeovers from the preceding section are neither achieved through worker reallocations within employers nor are they brought about by labor reallocations across employers and sectors. By exclusion, the remaining explanation is that formal-sector employers in the traded-goods industries shrink their workforces by dismissing less-schooled workers more frequently than more schooled workers while the thus displaced workers fail to find reemployment at least at the annual horizon. In the aggregate, the lacking traded-sector reallocations result in a considerable decline of formal manufacturing employment from 26 to 22 percent (Table 1 ). The simultaneous expansion of nontraded-output industries can partly be driven by a long-term shift from primary to manufacturing to services activities in the economy, or by Brazil's overvalued real exchange rate during the sample period, or by foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in the wake of Brazil's concomitant capitalaccount liberalization and privatization programme, by trade liberalization, or by a combination of these changes. I turn to the predictive power of these competing explanations and their associated variables in the next section. In the then following section, I return to the issue of reallocation durations beyond the annual horizon.
Establishment Workforce Changes
While the timing of labor-demand changes, workforce changeovers and variations in the reallocation pattern is suggestive of the role that trade reform may play for the labor market, it remains to investigate the predictive power of competing policy variables. For this purpose, I aggregate the universe of employment records on December 31st to the establishment level and turn to a employer-level version of the linked employeremployee data by retaining all establishments that employ at least one worker from the nationwide and metropolitan random worker samples in the preceding sections. Employer-level regressions are most closely comparable to prior evidence (Davis et al. 1996 , Ribeiro et al. 2004 ). The interest lies on employment change at the establishment level and its covariation with various policy variables during the 1990-97 period. I restrict attention to manufacturing industries, where the bulk of Brazil's traded-goods sector employment occurs.
Statistical model. Consider the regression model
for employment change k,t+1 − kt at establishment k conditional on an indicator 1(exp kt ) whether establishment k belongs to an exporting firm at time t, sector-level control variables z jt for establishment k's sector j, and establishment-level variables x kt , where α k are time-invariant establishment-fixed effects, α t are establishment-invariant time effects, and kt is a well-behaved error term. The sector-level variables z jt include predictors related to Brazil's time-varying trade regime. In the regression sample, t spans 1990 to 1997. A concern is whether predictors can be causally related to employment changes. Establishment-fixed effects subsume sector-fixed effects and thus remove potentially confounding sector differences in labor-market consequences from the constitutional changes to labor-market institutions prior to trade reform. Recall that Brazil's abrupt trade policy shift in 1990, though surprisingly implemented by the executive and largely designed in the absence of private-sector consultations, hits previously highly protected industries with the strongest tariff reductions so that the tariff dispersion drops-thus turning trade policy into an endogenous instrument, potentially correlated with sectoral labor-market differences. Similarly, differences in establishment-level employment growth rates may be related to export status not only through an employer's export status itself. Drawing on prior work in Muendler (2004) , I use as instrumental variables (IVs) foreign components of the real exchange rate. These components are: the U.S. PPI by industry, the PPI of select Western European countries by industry, the OECD-wide PPI by industry, and a worldwide mix of WPI and PPI for Brazil's twenty-five major trading partners for all OECD countries. These foreign prices are plausibly exogenous to Brazil's price and cost evolution. These four sector and time varying instrumental variables are used to predict the export indicator 1(exp. kt ) and its interaction with product tariffs as well as the product tariff and intermediate-input tariff (in z jt ). Brazil's nominal exchange rate is not an instrument for model 3 because time variation is already controlled for with year indicators. Four instrumental variables for these four potentially endogenous predictors make the model just identified. I retain the sector real exchange rate itself among the predictors in z jt because its variation depends on Brazil's sectoral (wholesale) price index beyond the four instrumental variables. Sources: RAIS 1990-98 (employers of male workers, 25 to 64 years old, with manufacturing job in 1% random sample nationwide and in 5% random sample for metropolitan areas) and SECEX 1990-98. Sector information at subsector IBGE level.
Data and estimates. As Table 6 shows, the nationwide mean manufacturing establishment between 1990 and 1997 reduces employment by 2.5 workers over the course of the subsequent year , and the mean metropolitan establishment cuts employment by a net number of 2.6 workers. Though slightly higher in levels, there is less dispersion in net employment changes across metropolitan establishments. Sixteen percent of the establishments belong to an exporting firm both nationwide and in metropolitan areas (but average employment at metropolitan exporters is larger, recall Table 1 ). Not conditioning on exports status, the average size of metropolitan establishments is below nationwide average with 16.3 workers (2.792 in logs) compared to 17.7 (2.876 in logs), while the size dispersion is wider in metropolitan areas than nationwide. Metropolitan establishments retain their workers slightly longer than nationwide average, resulting in a higher mean tenure at the establishment, and show both more educated workforces and a more skill-intensive occupation profile. Metropolitan manufacturing establishments produce in slightly less tariff protected sectors and in sectors with slightly higher levels of foreign penetration. In summary, metropolitan manufacturing establishments face somewhat tougher foreign competition and are slightly smaller and more skilled, but metropolitan establishments are more diverse along several dimensions. Table 7 presents regression results for the nationwide sample from five alterna- tive specifications. All specifications condition on establishment and year fixed effects. Sector-level tariff variables have no statistically significant predictive power when included by themselves in the first specification. Establishment-level variables are salient predictors in terms of statistical significance. Large establishments in terms of log employment grow significantly less in the subsequent year, establishments with high-tenure workers (and thus high worker retention rates) grow significantly more.
Establishments that have a larger share of professional occupations or a larger share of unskilled white-collar occupations add to their workforces during the 1990-97 period, whereas establishments with a larger share of skilled blue-collar occupations add fewer workers to the workforce (unskilled blue-collar occupations are the omitted category). Taken together with the prior evidence that the share of blue-collar occupations expands in the traded-goods sector, these findings suggest that workforce changeovers are largely driven by more than proportional worker layoffs from high-skill occupations at low-skill intensive employers. The overall goodness of fit of merely .6 percent indicates that the bulk of the variation in establishment-level employment changes remains unexplained. These findings remain unaltered as the specifications become richer. Including additional sector variables related to Brazil's international economic integration and industrial structure does not result in better predictive power of tariffs in specification 2. Import penetration partly captures unobserved non-tariff barriers, the sectoral real exchange rate controls for sector variation in Brazil's relative prices beyond the time variation of the year fixed effects, FDI flows into the sample manufacturing sectors partly measure the effect of capital-account liberalization and privatization on employment changes, and Herfindahl concentration indices approximate domestic competitive conditions. No single sector variable is a statistically significant predictor of establishment-level employment changes itself, and neither are tariff variables good predictors. The lacking statistical significance stands in surprising contrast to the salient correlation of these regressors with firm-level productivity in Brazil's manufacturing sector (Muendler 2004) .
The establishment's parent-firm export-status, however, is a significant predictor of employment change once included in specification 3. Being an exporter predicts a net employment loss of more than two workers, a substantial number given the mean establishment size of 16 workers. Contrary to what classic trade theory might lead us to anticipate, exporter establishments significantly reduce their workforces over the 1990-97 period. The predicted employment loss at exporters between 1990 and 1997 needs to be qualified, however, as the interaction of tariff protection with exporting status is a significant control variable (specification 4). The typical exporter cuts almost nine jobs in an unprotected sector with zero tariffs, but tariff protection mitigates the effect. Given a .11 standard deviation of product-market tariffs in the nationwide sample, the point estimate on the interaction term implies that raising tariffs by a standard deviation reduces the predicted job loss at exporters by four jobs from almost nine to under five jobs lost. At the sample mean product-market tariff level of .19, the mean exporter has a predicted job loss of 2.1 jobs. There is no conclusive evidence, however, that exporting status is causally related to employment reductions. When firm-level export status and its interaction with product-market tariffs (as well as product and intermediate-input tariffs) are instrumented for with sector-year varying foreign components of the real exchange rate (specification 5), export status loses its statistical significance.
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Yet, there is no evidence against the causal impact of exporting status on employment changes either in that the sign remains negative and the point estimate increases in absolute value. Establishment heterogeneity in unobserved workforce composition, or other unobserved sources of heterogeneity, may be associated with both exporting status and employment change and could hamper identification in the IV approach.
I estimate model 3 also for the metropolitan sample. Table 8 presents the results. Sign patterns and point estimates are remarkably similar between the nationwide and the metropolitan samples. The predicted number of lost jobs at exporters in unprotected sectors (with zero tariffs) is now eight-with a standard-deviation increase in tariffs predicting three lost jobs less or around five lost jobs after a one-standard deviation increase. At the sample mean product-market tariff, exporting status predicts a net job loss of 2.2 jobs, slightly above the nationwide average because of a lower tariff protection effect. Similar to the nationwide results, an IV approach raises point estimates but shows no statistically significant effect of exporting status on net employment change.
In principle, linked employer-employee data also permit the construction of estimation samples that trace changes to establishment-level employment through hires and fires at the job level. The construction of according estimation samples is a promising path for future research in that such samples make it possible to control for establishments' workforce heterogeneity at the individual worker and job level. A remaining concern of this paper is what consequences the documented trade regime changes may have for labor-market outcomes.
Labor Market Performance
Most evidence so far suggests that the metropolitan areas of Brazil are strikingly similar to the national average. If anything, the lower levels of tariff protection in the sectors of the typical metropolitan exporters and the higher levels of import penetration (Table 6) would suggest a stronger impact of trade reform on labor-market performance. Accordingly, establishment level regressions in the preceding section predict that, at the sample mean, exporters reduce employment by 2.2 jobs in metropolitan areas but only by 2.1 jobs nationwide. On the other hand, metropolitan areas have a somewhat larger services sector in employment terms (Table 1) , and a majority of displaced manufacturing workers with successful formal-sector reallocations shifts to 7 F test statistics for the predictive power of the four instrumental variables are above values of 1,000 for the two endogenous sector-level regressors (product-market and intermediate-input tariffs) and above 100 for the two endogenous firm-level regressors (export status and its interaction with product-market tariffs). services. Metropolitan establishments also exhibit more diversity (as measured by standard deviations) in terms of employment size and the skill composition of their workforces (Table 6 ). Inasmuch as the presence of a larger services sector or the diversity of manufacturing establishments are conducive to faster re-absorptions, it is an open question whether the stronger exposure of the metropolitan areas in Brazil to the international economy would result in a better or worse labor-market performance following trade liberalization. The empirical answer is unambiguous. In order to measure times to successful reallocation, I take a sample of workers with a separation at any time between 1990 and 1997 and track whether they are successfully rehired into a formal-sector job within the 48 months following their separation. Table 9 shows that almost two in three successfully reallocated workers in metropolitan areas find a new job within the month of their separation. In contrast, only one in seven workers nationwide is successfully rehired within the same month of displacement. In metropolitan areas, 95 percent of the successfully reallocated workers start their new job within twelve months. But only 77 percent of the successfully reallocated workers nationwide find new employment nationwide within a year, 13 percent need up to two years, six percent need up to three years and four percent need up to four years. There is a slight worsening in the time-to-reallocation in both metropolitan and nationwide labor markets between 1990 and 1997 but this time variation is small compared to the substantial regional differences. In short, metropolitan labor markets perform considerably faster in the reallocation process even though evidence in the earlier sections shows only small differences between the metropolitan employer and employee characteristics and the nationwide characteristics.
Two candidate explanations for the substantial difference between metropolitan and national labor markets, consistent with the documented evidence in this paper, are the presence of a larger services sector and the diversity of the manufacturing establishments in metropolitan areas. The differences along these two dimensions seem small, however, to give rise to the considerable differences in labor-market performance across regions, and more research into the functioning of labor-market adjustment seems warranted for an understanding of the economic performance after pro-competitive reforms.
Conclusions
This paper documents the changes to labor demand and workforce composition that accompany Brazil's large-scale trade reform in the early 1990s. Several aspects of the labor-market adjustment and workforce changeover in traded-goods industries are broadly consistent with the insights of Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory. Being a low-skill abundant country relative to its main trading partners, Brazil exhibits a shift towards sectors that intensely use low-skilled labor. Within sectors, Brazil shifts towards lowskill intensive occupations and fills those occupations with relatively better schooled workers-just as a Stolper-Samuelson argument applied to occupational activities instead of sectors would suggest. The setting of classic trade theory in a context of full employment within traded-goods industries is a less useful guide to Brazil's evidence, however. Among the displaced traded-goods sector workers with a successful reallocation, most shift to nontraded-output industries and almost as many displaced workers do not find formal reemployment at an annual horizon. Unexpectedly, regressions show that exporter establishments exhibit a significant employment downsizing over the period following trade liberalization, controlling for a large set of other establishment-level and sector-level predictors as well as establishment and year effects.
Though a firm's exporting status is a significant predictor of employment downsizing, an instrumental-variable approach provides neither evidence in favor nor against a causal interpretation of this prediction. Substantial workforce heterogeneity may affect the prediction. To control for the heterogeneity in workforce characteristics, linked employer-employee data can be used to construct worker-level samples and assess separations from and accessions to employers at the individual job level in future research. Although Brazil's metropolitan labor markets only slightly differ from the national average in sectoral composition and establishment-level diversity, workers experience much shorter times to successful reallocation. The striking but unexplained difference points to the limits in our current understanding of labor-market adjustment following large-scale pro-competitive reform. 
